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OPENING 
When Curt Bradley* asked me to speak at his new center, I 
accepted with pleasure.  Curt was a wise counselor at the State 
Department, and I am delighted that he is now directing a center that 
is focused on teaching and research in the areas in which my lawyers 
and I work daily. 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, I would like to take advantage of the fact that I am in the 
company of students and scholars to reflect on some of my 
experiences over the past year—to put what I have seen and heard 
into perspective.  For the past twelve months, on behalf of the 
Secretary of State, I have been engaged in an intensive dialog with 
our European partners on some of the most contentious and 
misunderstood issues of the day: namely, our counterterrorism laws 
and policies, especially those relating to the detention, questioning, 
and transfer of members of al Qaida and the Taliban.  Those 
discussions have not always been easy, but I believe we have made 
headway in explaining to our European partners our laws and 
policies, including recent legal developments, such as the new 
Department of Defense detention and interrogation policies. 
When I began this dialog a year ago, I felt that our disagreements 
did not reflect a growing transatlantic divide.  I continue to believe 
that, and still think many of our so-called differences are rooted in 
 
Copyright © 2007 by John B. Bellinger, III. 
 * Curtis Bradley is the Director of the Center for International and Comparative Law 
and the Richard and Marcy Horvitz Professor of Law at the Duke University School of Law. 
08__BELLINGER.DOC 10/4/2007  9:58:01 AM 
514 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:513 
misunderstanding, but I also believe that we do have different 
approaches on some issues. 
George Bernard Shaw famously said that the United States and 
England are two countries divided by a common language.  There are 
times when observers could be forgiven for wondering whether the 
United States and Europe are two cultures divided by a common 
system of (international) law.  Reading the headlines, one would 
think that we have profoundly different, perhaps even irreconcilable, 
visions of international law and international legal order.  But how do 
you square this with our longstanding—and shared—traditions of rule 
of law and respect for law?  Or the network of treaties, institutions, 
and regimes that bind us and through which we work and cooperate 
successfully on a daily basis?  Or the fact that the international legal 
framework that exists today was one the United States—with its 
European allies—was instrumental in creating? 
The plain fact is that we have more in common than not.  But 
this is sometimes forgotten, and our differences are distorted or 
magnified in ways that prevent, rather than promote, mutual 
understanding.  Why?  A somewhat glib explanation might be that 
this is the “narcissism of minor differences” at work.  The term—
coined by Freud—describes the phenomenon of fundamentally 
similar peoples who seize upon their minor differences, exaggerating 
them to the point of caricature or conflict.  There may be some truth 
there, but if you look at the issues that have been the most divisive, 
they are primarily in the high-stakes, emotionally fraught field of 
combating transnational terrorism.  Thus, in the larger scheme they 
may be minor differences, but they are not differences on minor 
issues. 
What troubles me deeply, however, about the discussion of 
transatlantic differences is the conclusion that is sometimes drawn: 
that the United States, unlike its European partners, does not take 
international law seriously.  This is patently wrong—and dangerous.  
Having differences is normal and natural, but turning them into 
something they are not—a cartoonish picture of the United States as 
an international actor that cares only about power, not law—erodes 
trust and impedes dialog. 
Because this issue is so important, I want to take a moment to 
address it, before offering some thoughts on the nature and source of 
transatlantic differences and misunderstandings.  Then I will discuss 
in greater detail a few areas in which such differences have surfaced. 
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I.  THE UNITED STATES IS  
SERIOUS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The U.S. Government believes that international law matters.  
The seriousness with which we take international law is evident in 
both our approach to its making and in our commitment to the 
resulting obligations.  It is also reflected in our record of leadership 
on issues where international action is not merely desired, but is truly 
required.  The irony is that this very seriousness can sometimes work 
against us. 
Let me illustrate.  Because we take our international obligations 
seriously, we do not enter into them lightly.  In negotiations, my 
lawyers and I push for clarity of language—Congress and the public 
need to know what we are signing up to.  Unfortunately, our efforts 
to fend off fudged language are sometimes criticized as obstructionist, 
or as attempts to block consensus. 
In addition, we will not join a treaty until we know we can 
implement it.  In some cases, it proves difficult or impossible to get 
implementing legislation—even when we are already substantially 
compliant with the obligations the treaty would impose.  Contrast this 
with the many countries that join first and tackle implementation 
later—an approach particularly common in the fields of international 
environmental and human rights law.  The result is that the United 
States can look like a laggard or malingerer, reluctant to make an 
international commitment.  Ironically, in such cases we take a bigger 
reputational hit than those countries that join but then utterly fail to 
comply.  Compliance issues do not lend themselves so readily to the 
sound-bite. 
A related issue is our greater reluctance to sign up to a treaty 
simply to join consensus or set international standards, especially 
when we need to ignore well-founded concerns in order to do so. This 
can cost us, particularly when the treaty is—or seems to be—on a 
feel-good topic.  For example, we have recently taken a drubbing 
over the UNESCO Cultural Diversity Convention, accused of being 
against culture, against diversity, and against treaties.  This is 
nonsensical.  The United States is one of the most multicultural 
nations on the planet.  The Convention, however, reflects in part the 
efforts of some countries to engage in protectionist behavior under 
the guise of diversity.  Its ambiguous language can be read to permit 
the imposition of restrictive trade measures on goods and services 
defined as “cultural,” including books, newspapers, magazines, and 
perhaps even internet content.  This could subvert other international 
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mechanisms, such as the WTO,* and could, by hindering the free flow 
of information, raise human rights concerns.  It is also inconsistent 
with the values embodied in our First Amendment. 
Failure to join a treaty regime, however, should not be equated 
with a lack of respect for international law.  Nor should it be viewed 
as a lack of concern for the underlying substantive issue.  There are 
more ways than one to demonstrate commitment.  For example, in 
the case of the recently concluded U.N. Disabilities Treaty, we 
participated actively in the drafting and provided expert advice, 
although we do not intend to become a party.  Our basic position—
stemming in part from our experience with the Americans with 
Disabilities Act—is that the best way to improve the life of the 
world’s disabled is for countries to concentrate on their domestic legal 
frameworks. 
In contrast, on difficult issues that clearly do require 
international action, the United States has for years been a leader. 
Consider one example.  When the United States adopted the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, no other developed nation was willing 
to treat the bribery of foreign government officials by businesses as 
an impediment to international development and commerce.  U.S. 
companies complained bitterly that our principled stand left them at a 
competitive disadvantage, and pointed out that for some European 
companies, such bribes were not only not illegal, but tax deductible.  
A quarter century of U.S. leadership, however, has led to both the 
OECD** Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Government 
Officials and the U.N. Convention Against Corruption.  Without this 
leadership it is doubtful that we would now have these international 
regimes that serve the public interest in good government and 
transparency. 
Before moving on, I want to briefly raise one last issue—the 
perception that the U.S. Government not only fails to take 
international law seriously, but that we believe we can ignore it 
altogether. To some extent, this view has reached the public 
consciousness through a narrow academic debate regarding the 
relationship between the Constitution and international law.  It is 
sometimes recast like this: the United States, unlike many European 
countries willing to subordinate themselves to international law, 
 
 * World Trade Organization 
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places the Constitution above all else, and believes that presidential 
power reigns supreme. 
This is simply not true.  International law can form part of our 
national law.  In fact, the Constitution has the effect of incorporating 
treaties into U.S. law, and it is thus silly to assert, as some have, that 
the United States believes that treaties are not binding on us.  On the 
contrary, we certainly do recognize that they are binding.  The 
Constitution also authorizes Congress to implement the “Law of 
Nations,” what we now call customary international law.  In these 
situations, compliance with international law becomes a matter of 
U.S. law. 
II.  THE NATURE AND SOURCE  
OF SOME TRANSATLANTIC DIFFERENCES AND 
MISUNDERSTANDINGS 
The issues that I have just discussed highlight some general 
differences in approaches to international law, and so are a good 
jumping-off point to a more specific discussion of transatlantic 
differences and misunderstandings.  The United States and some of 
its European allies do have a number of differences on international 
law, on a variety of levels: interpretive, substantive, institutional or 
process-related, and philosophical.  But in this past year, I have 
realized that a surprising number of our so-called differences are 
overblown or erroneous, the product of faulty premises or shoddy 
analysis.  For example, often what is billed as a legal difference is 
really a difference in policy; this type of mistake crops up with the 
issue of detainee status, which I will discuss in more detail later on. 
People also regularly fall into the classic comparative law trap of 
contrasting an idealized version of their own legal system with the 
failures or aberrations of the foreign system—and then extrapolate a 
set of conclusions.  This is made all too easy by the natural asymmetry 
in information, where impressions of foreign systems are formed 
primarily by news reports.  Take Abu Ghraib.  The abhorrent 
incidents of abuse of detainees by U.S. personnel created the 
perception in the minds of some that the U.S. Government condones 
torture.  Repugnant and unlawful behavior becomes, in some minds, 
representative of U.S. policy.  The United States, however, has taken 
steps to prosecute and punish such illegal behavior as well as to clarify 
treatment standards, for instance, by adopting the new Department of 
Defense detention and interrogation policies. 
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Such issues aside, many of our differences—and 
misunderstandings—can be traced to our distinct historical 
experiences and our legal cultures, traditions, and systems.  Our 
respective milieu have shaped not only our approaches and attitudes 
to international law, but our expectations of what international law 
can and should do. 
Our radically different experiences of World War II go some way 
towards explaining our respective approaches to international law.  
The United States emerged from the War with a pride in our nation 
and an unshaken faith in our institutions of democratic self-
governance.  For us, international law remained primarily a way to 
order relations among essentially self-reliant states.  In contrast, many 
European countries were scarred by their experience with 
nationalism and popular politics.  They lost confidence in the ability 
of national government to protect them not just from neighboring 
countries, but from their own worst selves.  Some looked to 
international law as a greater good, a way to constrain some of the 
forces that had wreaked such havoc.  These different experiences may 
help explain why Europeans appear more eager to legalize or 
judicialize international issues, even at the expense of domestic self-
government, whereas Americans are more comfortable allowing 
issues to be sorted out in the fields of politics or international 
relations. 
Our legal traditions and cultures have also affected how we 
engage on international legal issues.  I am of necessity overstating, 
and simplifying complex issues, but there is a core of truth in the 
notion that our common law tradition and legal and political culture 
incline us to pragmatism and skepticism; we probe the purpose and 
function of law, examine it through the lenses of other disciplines 
such as economics and sociology, weigh its costs against its benefits, 
test its flexibility against the facts at hand, judge its value by its 
effectiveness, and seek, where we can, an equitable solution.  We also 
have a tendency to approach legal solutions via the virtues that have 
been drummed into us: the proper starting point is a live case or 
controversy, not an abstract one; the issue must have reached a 
certain level of ripeness; and the solutions should be narrowly 
tailored—to survive the test of future fact patterns and possible 
challenge through the political process. 
When we bring this pragmatic, problem-oriented approach to the 
international arena, our partners who are steeped in Continental legal 
and political traditions look at us askance.  They are the products of a 
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tradition premised upon respect for abstract general principles and a 
rigorous and consistent application of a codified set of comprehensive 
rules.  Their commitment to this approach is not merely intellectual.  
They see the peace, prosperity and respect for human rights that 
Europe has developed since World War II as resting on this approach 
to international law.  To them, our approach can appear opportunistic 
or, worse, self-serving.  In turn, we are sometimes taken aback by 
what we see among certain Europeans as an excessive formalism, a 
doctrinal inflexibility, and an unwillingness to acknowledge that 
different paths may lead to the same end. 
Our problem-oriented approach also predisposes us to 
distinguish between issues that we believe lend themselves to 
international legal resolution and those that do not.  This can be at 
odds with a European tendency—heightened by experience with the 
European Union—to see the ideal international legal framework as 
one that is comprehensive and cohesive, that covers the field.  
Europeans are more likely than we are to try to fill perceived gaps in 
the international framework, and to promote a synthetic, self-
regulating international legal system.  To us, this can look like an 
almost unquenchable desire for more law and process, a desire that is 
particularly mystifying when it comes at the expense of domestic self-
government. 
Finally, there is an important set of differences arising out of the 
relationships between international and domestic legal systems.  I will 
touch on just one, a key one.  The soon-to-be twenty-seven members 
of the European Union accept the role of an international tribunal, 
the European Court of Justice, as the final arbiter of questions of 
European law that have direct effect in their domestic law.  Those 
countries and the other nineteen members of the Council of Europe 
also defer to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, 
and domestic legislation in some countries gives direct effect to the 
decisions of that court.  In the United States, in contrast, a debate 
exists as to whether our government has the authority to delegate to 
international tribunals the power to decide questions of international 
law that would have direct effect in our domestic law.  But let us turn 
now to some concrete examples to examine in more detail how some 
transatlantic differences, imagined and real, misapprehended and not, 
play out. 
08__BELLINGER.DOC 10/4/2007  9:58:01 AM 
520 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:513 
III.  INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a fitting place to start, 
because our decision to “unsign” the Rome Statute—that is, to notify 
the U.N., as depository of the Rome Statute, that we did not intend to 
become a party—sparked accusations of unilateralism and helped 
foster a view of the United States that has haunted subsequent 
actions and decisions.  Indeed, the story is sometimes framed as that 
of a superpower unwilling to accept any fetters on its freedom to act.  
In this story, we are contrasted to the Europeans, who—the better 
international citizens—are more willing to abide by international 
rules and submit their issues to international adjudication. 
The story is easy to tell and simple to grasp, in part because it fits 
so nicely into a certain set of preconceived notions—but it happens 
not to be true.  We share with the parties to the Rome Statute a 
commitment to ensuring accountability for genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity.  Our record is strong and clear: from 
Nuremberg to our unwavering support for the U.N. tribunals 
established to prosecute crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. 
What we disagree with is the ICC’s method for achieving 
accountability.  Our concerns are not frivolous, although to those who 
are products of different traditions these concerns may not be 
immediately convincing.  It is a deeply held American belief that 
power needs to be checked and public actors need to be held 
accountable.  From the U.S. perspective, the ICC lacks necessary 
checks and balances, in part because the Rome Statute gives the ICC 
prosecutor the ability to initiate cases without appropriate oversight 
by the U.N. Security Council, creating an undue risk of politicized 
prosecutions.  We also object on principle to the ICC’s claim of 
jurisdiction over persons from non-party states. 
It is because of these and other flaws that we were unable to 
become a party to the Rome Statute.  Should we have become a party 
despite these concerns?  Would that have reflected a deeper 
commitment to the rule of law and proved us to be better 
international citizens?  Some may think so, but I disagree.  In fact, 
reaching back to a point I made previously, I think our actions show 
the opposite—how seriously we take international law.  Embracing 
the Rome Statute in spite of our serious concerns could only reflect a 
cavalier attitude towards the Court and international law more 
generally. 
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Is this approach utterly at odds with that of other countries?  Not 
really.  It is natural for states to weigh the pros and cons of a 
particular action and make their choices accordingly.  For example, 
we have not signed up to the ICC, but have submitted ourselves to 
the jurisdiction of other adjudicative or arbitral bodies, such as the 
World Trade Organization and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.  In the 
context of the International Court of Justice, we do not accept the 
court’s compulsory jurisdiction, but are not alone in this respect.  
Several major European powers have not: for example, France, 
Germany, and Italy.  In fact, only one of the five permanent members 
of the Security Council has done so—the United Kingdom, with a 
number of reservations. 
I also don’t think that our decision on the ICC reflects a gap in 
values with the Europeans.  We were weighing the same principles 
and considerations; we just reached a different result.  We were 
deeply concerned about good process, institutional design, and the 
principle of political accountability. But our decision was in no way a 
vote for impunity.  We were confident that our domestic system was 
capable of prosecuting and punishing our citizens for these crimes. 
IV.  STATUS OF DETAINEES AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
The unfortunate image of the United States as unwilling to be 
bound by rules has spilled over into other issues, particularly in the 
field of international humanitarian law.  Take the issue of whether the 
United States was wrong not to give prisoner of war status to people 
we picked up on the battlefields of Afghanistan.  This is a subject on 
which there can be an honest policy disagreement.  However, it is 
wrong to say, as I have heard many times in Europe, that there was 
no legal basis for our decision. 
The United States did not invent the concept of “unlawful enemy 
combatants” to put people into a legal black hole.  The distinction 
between lawful and unlawful combatants has deep roots in 
international humanitarian law—it can be traced back to The Hague 
Regulations of 1899 and 1907.  Moreover, as a matter of law, al Qaida 
and Taliban detainees are simply not entitled to prisoner of war 
(POW) status.  The Third Geneva Convention does not ensure that 
everyone who takes up weapons on a battlefield receives POW status.  
In fact, the bulk of Third Convention protections, including POW 
status, are limited to belligerents engaged in an international armed 
conflict.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Hamdan decision reflects that the 
conflict between the United States and al Qaida is not an 
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international armed conflict, which means that captured al Qaida 
fighters are not entitled to POW protections.  In contrast, although 
we are in an international armed conflict with the Taliban, which was 
the effective government of a party to the Geneva Conventions, the 
Taliban’s fighters did not meet Third Convention requirements 
because they did not carry arms openly, wear a uniform recognizable 
at a distance, or respect the laws and customs of war. 
Some have argued that even if the Taliban and al Qaida are not 
entitled to POW status as a matter of law, the United States should 
grant them POW status as a matter of policy.  In fact, U.S. 
policymakers seriously considered doing this in 2002, but ultimately 
rejected this approach because they concluded that it would not serve 
the purposes of the Geneva Conventions to give POW status to a 
group responsible for the slaughter of thousands in disregard of the 
law of war. 
The Third Convention creates a compact for those engaged in 
international armed conflict.  Engage lawfully in combat and, if 
captured, you will receive comprehensive treatment protections. 
Ignore the laws of war, and you will not be entitled to those 
protections.  POW status can thus be seen as an incentive to follow 
the rules.  Weaken that incentive and the losers would be not only our 
own soldiers, but civilians—who bear the brunt of suffering when 
unlawful combatants operate surreptitiously within the general 
population. 
Our decision to try these unlawful combatants before military 
commissions has also been roundly criticized, but when our critics see 
how the recently signed Military Commissions Act works in practice, 
I believe they will realize that it offers an appropriate framework for 
these trials.  The Act provides all of the fundamental guarantees of 
fairness and due process, and addresses many concerns expressed by 
the international community.  For example, the accused have an 
unqualified right to hear all the evidence against them and may 
appeal their convictions all the way to the Supreme Court. 
Unfortunately, for some, any form of military justice carries a 
whiff of summary justice.  The United States, however, has a long and 
honorable tradition of military justice that is worthy of respect in both 
its design and its functioning.  Just look at the zealous advocacy of 
those military lawyers assigned to defend Guantanamo detainees.  In 
some countries like Germany, for example, where there is no 
comparable tradition of military justice, the image of a kangaroo 
court is hard to shake. 
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V.  PRIVACY 
Finally, one area in which we have seen a difference in approach 
between the United States and Europe is in how each balances state 
security and personal privacy.  As the U.S. Government increasingly 
looks for technological means of improving counterterrorism 
defenses, such as by building up electronic databases, foreign calls to 
protect data privacy have grown.  In recent years, many Europeans 
traveling to the United States have become alarmed at our 
government’s increasing demands for personal information.  This 
conflict has played out most noticeably in difficult negotiations 
between the United States and the European Union, in 2004 and 
again this year, over our requirement that airlines electronically 
supply the Department of Homeland Security with extensive data, so-
called passenger name records (PNR), on all arriving international 
travelers. 
There are genuine differences between the underlying American 
and European legal regimes for protecting personal privacy.  
European Union member states have highly formal systems grounded 
in comprehensive laws, presided over by independent data protection 
commissioners.  In particular, they limit the access of private firms to 
personal data.  In the United States, privacy protections are more 
diffuse and decentralized, comprising a patchwork, flexible “common 
law” of privacy made up of constitutional, statutory and regulatory 
provisions.  Other than medical records, we do not systematically and 
comprehensively regulate the efforts of private firms to acquire 
personal data.  We also have no tradition of data protection 
commissioners.  Ironically, however, in some areas, Europeans 
appear more willing to accept intrusions on their privacy than we are.  
For example, Britons submit to widespread video surveillance of 
public places, and Europeans universally carry national identity cards, 
something that does not exist in the United States, where even 
proposals to standardize state drivers’ licenses meet with widespread 
anxiety. 
Despite our differences, however, we have worked out mutually 
acceptable transatlantic privacy protections in the counterterrorism 
context.  In 2002, an agreement was reached for sharing personal data 
between U.S. law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and its new 
European counterpart, the European Police Agency (Europol).  In 
2003, the United States and the EU concluded historic agreements on 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and on extradition, 
regulating among other things the terms for sharing personal data 
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needed for use in criminal proceedings in the other’s territory.  Just 
last week an agreement was signed with Eurojust, a new EU 
organization responsible for coordinating serious trans-border 
criminal proceedings, which will provide an enhanced basis for 
transatlantic prosecutorial cooperation.  Even the sensitive question 
of sharing PNR data has been successfully settled between the United 
States and the EU, reassuring European passengers that their 
personal information is being safeguarded while giving the 
Department of Homeland Security a valuable tool for keeping 
terrorists and other criminals from our shores. 
Now a more ambitious effort is in the offing—the development 
of a framework agreement.  At a meeting in Washington on 
November 6, Attorney General Gonzales and Secretary of Homeland 
Security Chertoff and their European counterparts commissioned 
senior experts from their ministries and from the State Department to 
examine whether wide-ranging agreement would be possible in the 
law enforcement and border security areas.  The fact that this 
initiative is being taken up shows that in this particular area, 
American and European approaches to protecting privacy are coming 
together rather than moving apart. 
CONCLUSION 
All of these areas of legal differences and misunderstanding 
underscore the timeliness of creating a center devoted to 
international and comparative law.  Let me presume upon your 
hospitality to offer some of my hopes about what this Center might 
become. 
First, I am confident that under Curt’s leadership, this Center 
will address an unfortunate isolationist tendency in contemporary 
U.S. international and comparative law teaching and scholarship.  
This isolationism is not from the rest of the world, but rather from the 
rest of the legal education enterprise.  Too often international and 
comparative law have been electives, cultural detours from core 
subjects such as constitutional law, federal courts, administrative law, 
property, and contracts.  As a result, international and comparative 
law neither receive the respect they deserve, nor face the kind of 
bracing examination—using the same methodological tools and 
applying the same levels of intellectual discipline and energy—that is 
brought to bear on other law school subjects.  To make clear its 
relevance to all facets of legal training, the disciplines of international 
and comparative law must incorporate the rigor, creativity and focus 
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that we see in the domestic fields.  Curt’s own scholarship stands as a 
wonderful example of how to integrate international and foreign law 
with the study of the U.S. constitution and the federal courts system. 
Second, I hope this Center will break down the isolation of 
international and comparative law by encouraging teachers of all law 
school courses to draw on foreign and international examples and 
experience.  For example, courses in criminal law and criminal 
procedure could explore the rules and methods of continental Europe 
to illustrate plausible alternatives to our approach.  The same point 
applies to every subject in the regular law school curriculum.  We 
Americans need to get past the unstated assumption that the 
accomplishments of our legal system are unique and possibly 
superior.  Studying the achievements, as well as the failures, of other 
systems can illuminate our own. 
Third, I hope the Center will expand the opportunities to work 
with and learn from foreign colleagues.  Faculty and student 
exchanges can turn book learning about foreign law into something 
vivid and concrete.  More foreign faculty and students mean greater 
opportunity for joint research and discussion, both inside and outside 
the classroom.  Such collaborations not only educate the rest of the 
world about the best qualities of the United States—our enduring 
commitment to the rule of law and ordered liberty—but enrich our 
own understanding.  I also hope that this Center can encourage Duke 
faculty and Duke students to work and study in foreign countries. 
In conclusion, let me say that I am grateful to you, and 
particularly to Curt, for allowing me to take part in the inauguration 
of this Center.  I look forward to learning from your work, and in 
having as colleagues, lawyers whom this Center has touched and 
made better. 
